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Broadcasting Deregulation in South Korea
by Ki-sung Kwak
This paper examines the way in which new media technologies have com-
pelled policymakers to adapt regulatory frameworks and to restructure 
television broadcasting in order to accommodate technological change in 
South Korea. It focuses on the policy tensions between highly centralized 
forms of media that focus on the mass audience and new media that not only 
fragment the audience but are also much harder to regulate. The Korean 
government’s policy toward emerging broadcast media has allowed both 
existing and new players to participate in and develop different types of 
delivery platforms such as cable, satellite, digital multimedia broadcasting 
(DMB), and Internet protocol television (IPTV).
This paper discusses how the introduction of new broadcast technology in 
Korea has provided an opportunity for existing terrestrial broadcasters to fur-
ther strengthen their position by cautiously becoming involved in infrastruc-
ture while continuing to focus on their most important asset—programming 
that can be transmitted by any number of technical modalities. It also argues 
that the perceptions and principles of television broadcasting long held by 
the state have altered signiﬁ cantly during the government of Lee Myung-
bak. Unlike the previous governments’ media policies that emphasized the 
public responsibility of television broadcasting, the current government’s 
deregulation weighs in more on the side of the market economy. 
Broadcasting Policy under Authoritarian Regimes
Signiﬁ cant changes in the structure of television broadcasting have taken 
place in Korea since the advent of television. These changes, without ex-
ception, have been made by the political leadership. During the period of 
authoritarian regimes (1962–92), the state used television broadcasting to 
project its aims and goals onto the public as part of the process of shaping 
and changing society in accordance with its vision, while the broadcasters 
were forced to serve the interests and priorities of the state rather than those 
of the public or other interests.
State control of television broadcasting in Korea was gradually intensiﬁ ed 
under authoritarian governments until 1987. Since 1987, however, the 
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emerging political diversity provided by new governments has not brought any 
signiﬁ cant deregulation of the broadcasting industry. On the contrary, the 
state, to varying degrees, has exerted control within the established frame-
work of restrictions and guidelines. This is well evidenced by the fact that 
the major regulatory framework that was created in 1963 remained virtually 
unchanged until the late 1990s, with the exception of the creation in 1981 of 
a seemingly independent regulatory body, the Korean Broadcasting Com-
mission (KBC), whose role has been limited to monitoring and censoring, 
if necessary, the programs; it had no licensing power.
It is worth identifying some of the dominant features of television broadcast-
ing under Korea’s authoritarian governments. First, the state created a loose 
framework for broadcasting that was largely ambiguous, allowing the state 
maximum opportunity for control and intervention. The 1980 Basic Press 
Law, for example, broadly deﬁ ned and defended individuals’ rights, public 
morals, and social ethics; however, under this law journalists were prohibited 
from pursuing sensitive issues. Control measures used by the authoritarian 
governments included censorship by government ofﬁ cials who were placed 
in the newsrooms, issuance of weekly guidelines via memos, directing all 
media on how to handle given stories, and the prohibition on newspapers 
from stationing correspondents outside of Seoul. Second, state political con-
trol has largely remained unchanged in spite of the media reforms in 1980 
and 1987 and the extension of television broadcasting structures, including 
the creation of new bodies—Seoul Broadcasting System (SBS), KBC, and 
Foundation for Broadcasting Culture (FBC).
Traditionally, broadcasting in Korea has been perceived by Korea’s gov-
ernments as a medium that should be responsible to the public. Virtually 
all areas of television broadcasting, such as operations, ownership, and 
programming, were tightly controlled by the government under the guise 
of protecting and respecting the public interest. In this context, television 
broadcasting has remained for the most part under the direct control of the 
state. Indeed, every new development in television broadcasting in Korea 
has been met by creating more of the same regulatory structures, with their 
usual shortcomings—lack of legislative base, lack of policy framework, 
lack of coordination between agencies, and lack of clarity of the roles and 
functions of agencies in order to form a consistent and functioning whole.
Emerging New Media and Regulatory Changes
Television broadcasting has traditionally been protected because of the fact 
of spectrum scarcity. Thus, regulatory frameworks have been based on a set 
of old rules that have safeguarded (terrestrial) television broadcasting as a 
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distinct industry, and governments have created entry barriers to protect these 
privileged monopolies.1 This traditional justiﬁ cation has been destroyed, 
however, since the development of new transmission technologies. As the 
number of delivery systems increases and alternative sources of ﬁ nance 
become available, the role of governments in the process of accommodat-
ing new media technology has become more complicated. Yet, in the initial 
phase of development in the second half of the 1990s, new broadcast media 
in Korea have been loosely incorporated into the existing regulatory frame-
work with the same logic that applied to terrestrial television broadcasting. 
A series of errors—for example, mismanagement of the cable television 
industry and political wrangling over the launch of satellite television—have 
hindered the development of a new television industry.
In Korea, the development of both cable and satellite TV was not driven by 
consumer demand, but by the government, which aimed to provide greater 
channel diversity. The expectation was that this would shield Korean viewers 
from exposure to foreign cultures, especially Japanese, and would promote 
economic competitiveness. When cable television was introduced in 1995, 
cable operators believed that, as long as they had licenses from the govern-
ment, their future would be guaranteed. In the initial phase, however, there 
emerged a series of problems, such as poor government management and 
regulation and then an economic crisis, forcing the Korean government to 
deregulate the industry.2 In the restructuring process, the Korean government 
in the late 1990s was forced to deregulate the cable industry after it failed 
to ﬁ nd a new model that was different from the conventional (terrestrial) 
television. Further deregulation was evident in the 2000 Broadcast Law, 
which not only provided a basis for the launch of satellite television but 
also relaxed the entry restrictions on several sectors of new broadcasting 
industry, such as multiple station operators and multiple program providers. 
This was a major turning point at which the government began to recognize 
that broadcasting was subject to economic imperatives similar to those of 
other industries.
Regulation of the new types of television broadcasting in Korea illustrates 
the importance of the political context. Although Korea launched its own 
satellite (Mugunghwa) in 1995, the start of satellite broadcasting service 
had long been hampered by the complete absence of a legal basis. Although 
the existing laws of the 1990s, namely the Broadcast Law and the Cable 
Broadcast Law, covered terrestrial and cable television service, respectively, 
a new law for satellite broadcasting was urgently needed. The issue of 
changing the existing broadcast law was ﬁ rst raised as early as 1993, when 
the newly elected president, Kim Young-sam, the ﬁ rst civilian president in 
Korea in more than thirty years, made it part of his media reform effort. As 
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a result, the government proposed a new broadcast law, which would replace 
the existing Broadcast Law and Cable Broadcast Law. Since its introduc-
tion in Parliament, however, the proposed new broadcast law that provides 
a legal basis for satellite television has been continuously blocked in the 
legislature owing to differing interests on the key issues, namely the role 
of KBC and the permission for business conglomerates and newspaper 
companies to participate in satellite broadcasting.3
Later, attempts to further regulate television broadcasting through the pro-
posed new broadcast law were bitterly overshadowed by political impera-
tives.4 After a number of discussions and negotiations among the political 
parties, the proposed new broadcast law was expected to pass in Parliament. 
However, just before it was tabled in early December 1995, the proposed 
law was shelved until the next parliamentary session. The ﬁ nal decision 
came directly from the president’s ofﬁ ce, the Blue House.
Although several conclusions can be drawn from this sudden change, the 
most likely reason for the postponement of the proposed new broadcast law 
should be understood in the political context. At the end of 1995, politics 
in Korea was dominated by large political scandals. Former president Roh 
Tae-woo and his predecessor Chun Doo-hwan were charged with receiv-
ing illicit transfers from the slush funds of business conglomerates during 
their presidencies and with mutiny and sedition linked to their roles in the 
1979 coup d’état and the 1980 massacre of hundreds of pro-democracy 
demonstrators in Kwangju. At the same time, in the run-up to the general 
parliamentary election in April 1996, both the government and the opposi-
tion had to minimize the potential damage caused by a series of political 
scandals. In this political context, the hasty passing of the controversial 
new broadcast law could have worsened the position of the government. 
Because the majority of past broadcast-related laws, such as the Basic Press 
Law in 1981 and the Cable Broadcast Law in 1989, were enacted without 
the opposition parties or the general public and broadcasters consenting to 
them, the government of that time, led by Kim Young-sam, did not want to 
create a proﬁ le similar to the previous governments.
Thus, the proposed new broadcast law was shelved in 1997 when other politi-
cal issues, such as the acceptance of political slush funds by the president’s 
son, dominated politics in Korea. At the same time, the government, facing 
the 1997 presidential election, needed to have a good relationship with the 
media in order to secure favorable coverage. The Uniﬁ ed Broadcast Law 
was ﬁ nally passed in Parliament at the end of 1999, almost six years after 
the ﬁ rst draft was proposed. In the following year, Korea Digital Satellite 
Broadcasting (with the brand name of Skylife), a consortium of 159 com-
panies including Korea Telecom and three national broadcasters (Korean 
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Broadcasting System [KBS], Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation [MBC], 
and SBS), was granted a monopoly license for satellite broadcasting.
In addition to cable and satellite platforms, the Korean government in 
2005 granted licenses for two types of DMB service, terrestrial DMB 
and satellite DMB. As for the terrestrial DMB service, existing terrestrial 
broadcasters—KBS, SBS, MBC, and Christian Broadcasting Service—and 
Yonhap Television Network (YTN), a cable channel specializing in news and 
current affairs, and a consortium consisting of several small companies were 
granted licenses to operate on over-the-air signals. A telecommunication 
company, the SK Telecom-owned TU Media, was granted a satellite DMB 
license to provide video-on-the-move service that was beamed through a 
communication satellite.
The start of DMB marked the start of the telecommunication companies’ 
participation in the broadcasting business. In many countries, telecommu-
nication companies’ participation in the broadcast business has been, to a 
varying degree, visible with the emergence of new technologies. While the 
level of their participation has been largely decided by government poli-
cies and regulations that were designed to accommodate the convergence 
of telecommunication and broadcasting, governments in many countries 
have allowed and plan to allow the telecommunication companies that have 
already established the delivery network infrastructure to enter the television 
business. The involvement of telecommunication companies in the broad-
casting business in the form of pay television was a signiﬁ cant departure 
from the past regulatory structure that eliminated competition.
In Korea, telecommunication companies that provide high-speed Internet 
service have been keen to participate in the broadcast business. Korea be-
came a world leader in high-speed broadband largely because the Korean 
government initiated and facilitated broadband development through its 
early commitment to high-speed infrastructure with speciﬁ c programs such 
as low-interest loans. However, telecommunication companies’ participation 
in the broadcast business utilizing their networks was limited until 2008. 
In early 2005, the Ministry of Information and Communication (MOIC) 
announced that the telecommunication companies would be allowed to 
provide broadcast service. However, two conditions were added. First, they 
were not allowed to start before 2007. Second, in the interim they would 
be allowed to offer only Internet content-on-demand service. MOIC justi-
ﬁ ed its deliberate delay of the telecommunication companies’ broadcast 
business by saying it needed to give the cable industry enough time to 
deploy digital set-top boxes and achieve digital subscriber penetration of 
at least 2.23 million by 2007 and roll out new services such as telephony 
and broadband services.5
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Policy Change toward Competition
The convergence of broadcasting and telecommunications, due to rapidly 
developing technologies, has invariably prompted regulators in various 
parts of the world to redeﬁ ne and restructure the broadcasting industry. To 
respond to these challenges, the Lee government announced the amendment 
of several media-related laws, which broadly cover IPTV, contents, digita-
lization, program export, frequency management, and upgrading network 
and Internet service.6 The push by the Lee government for deregulation 
of broadcasting is well summarized in its proposed reform plan,7 which 
emphasizes the strong need to strengthen the competitiveness of the local 
media industry in a global context and to encourage media to produce better 
content for viewers. This section brieﬂ y discusses two hot-button issues: 
IPTV and cross-media ownership.  
Launch of IPTV
The ambiguous boundaries of the regulatory structure concerning IPTV un-
der the previous dual regulatory structure—broadcasting regulated under the 
Broadcast Law by the KBC while telecommunications are regulated largely 
under the Telecommunications Law by the MOIC—have created confusion 
and conﬂ icts. Accordingly, the lack of consensus among the state regulators 
was a factor that delayed the launch of IPTV. After the Lee government took 
ofﬁ ce in 2008, these regulators were merged to form a single regulator, the 
Korea Communications Commission (KCC). Therefore, for the KCC, the 
launch of IPTV—a prime example of broadcasting-telecommunication 
convergence—has been not only a showcase of the new government but 
also an important boost for both the broadcasting and the telecommunica-
tion industries.
The government stressed that the launch of IPTV offers new growth oppor-
tunities in various sectors during 2009–13, with projections that the industry 
will generate 4,500 billion won worth of investment in the industry, the 
total market cost will reach 8,900 billion won, and 36,000 new jobs will be 
created.8 These projections have been further supported by other govern-
ment organizations, namely the Korea Information Society Development 
Institute and the Ministry of Strategy and Finance. These positive economic 
projections have been criticized, however, by opposition parties and citi-
zens’ organizations that claim that the data failed to reﬂ ect the ﬁ nancial 
difﬁ culties the current pay TV market has faced. These concerns can be 
further explained in terms of the level of competition IPTV could bring to 
the industry as a whole and the capacity of the new IPTV platforms (Korea 
Telecom [KT], Lucky GoldStar Telecom [LGT], and Sun Kyung Telecom 
[SKT]) to secure programming. 
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In Korea, 95 percent of households subscribe to pay television. Among these, 
88 percent (15 million households) subscribe to cable, while 12 percent (2 
million) are satellite subscribers. In such a situation where the number of 
households subscribing to pay television has reached the near-saturation 
point, it is questionable whether another type of pay television—IPTV—
would be competitive. Korean consumption patterns show that in cable 
television, in particular, despite a gradual increase in penetration rates, 
the industry has made only a very modest amount per subscriber. Since 
2001, when the registration system replaced the existing license system for 
program providers, there has been a signiﬁ cant increase in the number of 
program providers—from 43 in 2001 to 180 in January 2004.9 As a result, 
the number of cable subscribers has increased sharply, as the cable operators 
have provided more diverse programs and channels.
The ﬁ nancial difﬁ culties resulting from the cable industry’s low subscription 
fees can be seen easily if we look at the annual income generated from the 
subscription fee paid by each household. In 1998, for example, when price 
tiering was not allowed, the average annual income from the subscription fee 
was $185 per household.10 It dropped to about one-third of that total by 2003. 
As of January 2009, more than 90 percent of 15 million cable subscribers 
take low tiering or cheap packages that cost $4 to $8 per month.11
In the case of terrestrial DMB, although 16 million receiver sets were sold 
in 2008, the service providers (terrestrial broadcasters) have faced serious 
ﬁ nancial difﬁ culty because advertising, their only source of revenue, has 
declined.12 Other providers of terrestrial DMB service—YTN DMB, Korea 
DMB, and Yuwon Media—recorded deﬁ cits totaling 17 billion won. Despite 
its slow increase in subscribers, Skylife—the sole direct-to-home satellite 
platform with slightly more than two million subscribers in total—saw a 
proﬁ t of 217 billon won in 2007. In contrast, the satellite DMB service 
operated by SK’s TU media saw a deﬁ cit of 74 billion won.13
Another issue that has emerged with the launch of IPTV is that there has 
been little difference in programming offered by the various platforms. 
This is particularly true when we consider that a number of programs on 
cable and satellite have been provided by the same program providers. The 
government argued that IPTV, utilizing its convergence capacity, would 
provide more interactive services such as interactive education programs, 
dramas in which the audience can participate, and provision of comprehen-
sive information portals.14 It is, however, questionable whether interactive 
strengths alone can be commercially viable and attractive enough to make 
cable subscribers migrate to IPTV. Therefore the key question is: In a situa-
tion where the existing pay TV operators provide similar types of programs 
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and packages, how will the IPTV operators differentiate their programs from 
those provided by different platforms? To promote IPTV, the proposed plan 
states that the regulator will closely monitor the cable television industry, station 
operators in particular, to see whether they monopolize the content by abusing 
their superior position in the market. At the same time, the government also 
encourages both program providers and terrestrial broadcasters to participate 
in IPTV as content providers.
Cross-Media Ownership
Another controversial issue contained in the proposed reform plan is the re-
laxation of cross-media ownership restriction that has prohibited newspaper 
companies and business conglomerates from owning shares in terrestrial 
broadcasting and cable news channels. The current ban on cross-media own-
ership has been in place since 1980 when the military regime led by Chun 
Doo-hwan forced all existing commercial broadcasters to be placed under 
the umbrella of public service broadcasting. MBC, owned by Kyung-Hyang 
Daily, became a public broadcaster while retaining its name, but Tongyang 
Broadcasting Company, owned by Samsung Group, was absorbed and re-
named KBS2. The KBS-MBC monopoly remained in place until the 1990 
launch of Seoul Broadcasting System (SBS), a commercial broadcaster.
The proposed bill, if passed, will allow large corporations and newspaper 
ﬁ rms to have up to a 20 percent stake in terrestrial television broadcasters, 
and 49 percent in cable news channels (Table 1). The main justiﬁ cation for 
this move is to strengthen the competitiveness of the local media industry 
in the rapidly changing environment and to encourage both old and new 
players to provide better contents for the viewers.15 While the regulations 
designed to prevent monopolies in more than one medium have varied 
among nations, cross-media ownerships are important particularly under 
aspects of competition because cross-marketing provides a substantial 
competitive advantage.16
In Korea, however, the logic of competition has been overshadowed by 
the cultural and political concept of broadcasting. This was well evidenced 
when the government regulated cable television in the mid-1990s. From the 
outset, the government regulated, rather than promoted, the cable television 
industry by strictly segregating station operators and program production. 
This has contributed signiﬁ cantly to hampering the development of cable 
television in its introductory stage.
The rationale of the deregulation was well expressed by one of the governing 
party’s key members of Parliament, who submitted the law:
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Source: Annual Report [in Korean] (Seoul: Korea Communications Commission, 2009).
* Conglomerates are deﬁ ned as businesses whose assets exceed 10 trillion won.
PP: Program Provider, except news programs
PP (news): Program Provider, news programs only
SO: Station Operator
DMB-T: Digital Multimedia Broadcasting, Terrestrial
DMB-S: Digital Multimedia Broadcasting, Satellite
IPTV: Internet Protocol Television
Table 1: Proposed Deregulation of Media Ownership
The rapidly changing media environment has signiﬁ cantly weak-
ened the traditional agenda-setting role of the newspapers, largely 
because of the restrictions imposed in 1980 which prohibited news-
papers from participating broadcasting business. So, it is necessary 
to provide an opportunity for the struggling newspaper companies 
to develop and become a sustainable medium.17
Underlying this comment is, on the one hand, the dissatisfaction of the Grand 
National Party (GNP) with the national free-to-air television broadcasters 
(KBS and MBC in particular) during the previous reformist governments 
(1998–2007), and, on the other hand, the GNP’s strong intention to sup-
port conservative newspapers by allowing them to take part in emerging 
broadcasting business. Indeed, under the reformist governments, the Roh 
Moo-hyun government in particular, the Korean media were polarized in 
that the conservative newspapers have aligned themselves with the GNP, 
while the national free-to-air television broadcasters sided with the govern-
ment and the ruling parties (Democratic Party and Uri Party). The reform-
oriented presidents’ determination to weaken the power of media met strong 
resistance from the conservative newspapers.
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The proposed bills were hailed by the major conservative newspapers such 
as the Chosun Daily, the Dong-A Daily, and the JoongAng Daily, which 
have been keen to provide broadcasting services. The proposition of de-
regulation of cross-media ownership, however, has met strong opposition 
from free-to-air television broadcasters and the media unions, such as the 
National Union of Media Workers, which claimed that the relaxation of 
cross-media ownership would eventually allow big business conglomerates 
and newspaper companies to have their own broadcasting services and that 
this would discourage independent and diverse views and limit freedom of 
expression.
Emerging Issues and Discussion
On the basis of an examination of the context in which new broadcast 
media—cable, satellite, DMB, and IPTV—have been introduced and devel-
oped in Korea, this paper has provided an overall background that explains 
the way in which the Korean state has restructured television broadcasting 
and its regulation. One of the most salient features noted in the restructuring 
process has been that regulatory intervention has been designed to protect 
the interests of the terrestrial broadcasters. This has largely proven to be true 
when we consider the extent to which the existing terrestrial broadcasters 
have been allowed to get involved in the emerging new delivery platforms. 
All three terrestrial broadcasters have been actively involved in the cable 
television business as program providers with their own cable channels.
All terrestrial broadcasters, furthermore, are the major shareholders of the 
newly started satellite broadcaster, Skylife; they were granted a license for 
terrestrial DMB service and, more recently, they signed a memorandum of 
understanding to supply their programs to the IPTV service that started in late 
2008. The programs provided by terrestrial broadcasters have been favored 
in all new delivery platforms. The popularity of terrestrial broadcaster–
owned pay channels has been another indicator that shows the superiority 
of terrestrial programs. Indeed, their drama and sports channels have been 
the most popular channels in both cable and satellite lineups.
Conversely, this means that terrestrial broadcasters’ expansion into new 
media has not only weakened the possibility for new dominant players to 
evolve, but, to a certain extent, has discouraged the development of the new 
media industry as a whole. This explains how the terrestrial broadcasters, 
despite the challenges from cable and satellite channels, have maintained 
their dominance in the television industry in Korea. In a similar vein, it is 
fair to say that regulatory intervention in Korea has been designed to protect 
the interests of the terrestrial broadcasters. This has been clear from the 
fact that terrestrial broadcasters have been allowed to participate in various 
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delivery platforms, the retransmission of their programs on other platforms 
has been prohibited, and the possibility for telecommunication companies 
to participate in broadcasting business has been delayed.
Another feature worth noting is that Korean broadcasting has experienced 
a gradual retreat from its traditional role—responsibility to the public—
and an advance toward increased economic liberalization and expansion 
of market-based broadcasting services. Up until the late 1990s, the Korean 
government was preoccupied with the social and cultural aspects—the 
public responsibility—of broadcasting, and this has been reﬂ ected continu-
ously in its broadcasting policies. This argument is well supported by the 
regulatory experience of public service broadcasting (MBC in particular) 
in the 1990s. Recognizing that partial reliance on advertising (as for KBS) 
or entire reliance on advertising (as for MBC) has been the major obstacle 
that undermined the very nature of public service broadcasting in Korea, a 
number of government-commissioned reports suggested that major structural 
changes be made to KBS and that MBC be privatized.18 While the major-
ity of the recommendations for KBS were adopted and implemented, none 
of those for MBC were adopted. This clearly shows that MBC’s role as a 
public broadcaster, although it generates proﬁ ts entirely from advertising, 
prevailed.
The Korean government began to embrace competition in its broadcasting 
policy in the late 1990s when the cable industry was near collapse. Since 
then, however, the process in which both the regulators and broadcasters 
have learned and adopted this market principle in the broadcasting industry 
has been slow.
The deregulation of cross-media ownership restrictions contained in the 
current proposed bill has posed a threat to incumbent broadcasters, as they 
fear new channels owned and operated by newspaper companies and big 
business conglomerates could signiﬁ cantly challenge their dominance. In 
this sense, deregulation can be seen as an important move to weaken, if not 
break, the terrestrial broadcasters’ dominance and at the same time foster 
diversity and competition in both delivery platforms and contents. Although 
the level of resistance from the incumbent broadcasters, with support of the 
opposition parties and civil organizations, remains strong, it is yet to be seen 
whether their dominance can be justiﬁ ed again. The ﬁ nal ﬁ ne-tuning of the 
proposed bills is due to be completed and tabled in the National Assembly 
in July 2009. 
Regardless of the speciﬁ cs of the ﬁ ne-tuning, the key issue will be to what 
extent the system can continue to serve social and cultural objectives after 
it has been opened up to commercial imperatives.
22151_081-093.indd   91 3/10/2010   4:06:21 PM
92 On Korea: Volume 3
Endnotes
1. R. Pepper, “Regulatory Concerns,” in Internet Television, ed. E. Noam, J. Groebel, 
and D. Gerbarg (London: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2004), 105–12.
2. K. S. Kwak, “New Broadcast Media in South Korea” (discussion paper, Korea-
Australasia Research Centre, University of New South Wales, Sydney, 2002); S. C. Lee 
and S. Joe, “Key Issues in the Korean Television Industry: Programmes and Market 
Structure,” in Television in Contemporary Asia, ed. D. French and M. Richards (New 
Delhi: Sage Publications, 2000), 131–49.
3. The Korea Press 1998 [in Korean] (Seoul: Korean Press Institute, 1997).
4. K. S. Kwak, “The Role of the State in the Regulation of Television Broadcasting 
in South Korea,” Media International Australia Incorporating Culture and Policy 92 
(1999): 65–79.
5. Korea Digital TV Summit 2005 Conference Report (Hong Kong: Media Partners 
Asia, Ltd., 2005).
6. Annual Report [in Korean] (Seoul: Korea Communications Commission, 2009).
7. Advancing Broadcasting and Telecommunication [in Korean] (Seoul: Korea Com-
munications Commission, 2008). 
8. 10-Point Plan for Broadcasting and Telecommunication” [in Korean] (Seoul: Korea 
Communications Commission, 2008).
9. Cable Television Industry in South Korea—Internal Report [in Korean] (Seoul: Korean 
Broadcasting Commission, 2004).
10. Ibid.
11. Youm Yong-sup et al., KISDI Issue Report: Economic Implications of Broadcasting 
Deregulation [in Korean] (Seoul: Korea Information Society Development Institute, 
2009).
12. See Chosun Daily, 13 February 2009.
13. Korea Media Yearbook [in Korean] (Seoul: Korea Press Foundation, 2008).
14. Advancing Broadcasting and Telecommunication [in Korean] (Seoul: Korea Com-
munications Commission, 2008).
15. Annual Report [in Korean] (Seoul: Korea Communications Commission, 2009).
16. Josef Trappel and Werner Meier, “Media Concentration: Options for Policy,” in Media 
Policy: Convergence, Concentration and Commerce (London: Sage, 2001), 191–206.
17. Na Kyung-won, GNP member of Parliament and member of the Standing Com-
mittee of Culture and Communication, National Assembly (interview cited in Yoon 
22151_081-093.indd   92 3/10/2010   4:06:21 PM
93 Broadcasting Deregulation in South Korea
Chang-bin, “Issues in Media Law: Interviews with the Key Members of the Standing 
Committee [Culture and Media] [in Korean],” Newspaper & Broadcasting, no. 454 
[2008]: 40–45).
18. Jung Yong-joon, “Structural Change of Public Service Broadcasting in South Korea 
[in Korean],” in The Role of Public Service Broadcasting (Seoul: Korea Broadcasting 
Association & KBS, 2002).
22151_081-093.indd   93 3/10/2010   4:06:21 PM
22151_000i-ii.indd   2 3/10/2010   3:50:40 PM
Korea Economic Institute of America
1800 K St. NW, Suite 1010, Washington, DC 20006
Ph: 202.464.1982   Fx: 202.464.1987  www.keia.org
Authors:
John Feffer
Myung-koo Kang
Thomas Cargill
Gilbert Rozman
Ki-sung Kwak
Keith Dinnie
Hyunjin Seo & Stuart Thorson
Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr.
Martyn de Bruyn & Sangmin Bae
KEI
On Korea was born in December 2006 with the initiation of KEI’s Academic Paper Series.
KEI commissions roughly ten papers per year with diverse perspectives on original subjects of 
current interest to Korea watchers. Each paper is distributed individually as a KEI Academic Paper 
to over 2,000 government officials, think tank experts, and scholars around the United States and 
the world and subsequently collated into On Korea.
The third volume of On Korea includes nine papers written by some of the leading scholars working 
on Korea today. To learn more about submitting a paper proposal to KEI for the Academic Paper 
Series, visit www.keia.org.
22151KEIA_Cover-N2.indd   1 8/9/10   10:45 AM
